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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the state agency that, after the passage of significant
pieces of federal civil rights legislation, begrudgingly hires its first
female employee, Nancy. Nancy expects some hostility and resent-
ful attitudes from her coworkers-after all, this agency is located in
a state that has been slow to recognize the non-domestic capabili-
ties of women in general, and therefore, reluctant to integrate wo-
men into its workplace. What Nancy does not expect, however, are
the overt and graphic sexual comments made at her expense.
Amidst the retaliatory verbal abuse, she is constantly "en-
couraged" to resign, or face even more retaliatory verbal abuse.
Nancy knows that she was fortunate to land a job in this elite and
exclusionary agency department, and consequently, strengthens
her resolve to stay despite the daily threats and innuendoes. One
coworker in particular, however, is relentless in his efforts to hu-
miliate and antagonize Nancy, and she soon finds her resolve
weakening. She decides to keep a record of each transaction with
this individual, in the hope of eventually pursuing sexual harass-
ment claims against him.
After a few months, Nancy consults an attorney who applauds
her diligent efforts at documenting the harassment, and promptly
files a grievance with the appropriate state agency. At the adminis-
trative hearing, the attorney presents what he presumes to be the
smoking gun: Nancy's detailed account of the harassment. Yet, de-
spite the smoking gun, Nancy's log is countered by the entire de-
partment's testimony that such harassment never took place and
that Nancy fabricated each and every purported interaction. One
by one, Nancy's coworkers take the stand to testify to the inno-
cence of the accused individual and the absurdity of Nancy's
claims. The agency's administrative law judge listens to the evi-
dence and rules in favor of the agency. Nancy loses and the agency
is affirmed in its discriminatory actions.
Disturbed, Nancy's attorney realizes that there are certain politi-
cal and philosophical realities surrounding the agency judge's deci-
sion and decides against appealing at the state court level. Instead,
the attorney files a Title VII discrimination claim in federal court.
One problem looms: Will Nancy's federal civil rights claim be pre-
cluded as a result of the unreviewed state administrative judge's
decision?
If Nancy's claims are precluded, her employer enjoys a virtually
airtight collateral estoppel defense Nancy, along with any other
complainant who loses at the state agency level, is therefore unable
to look to the federal courts for enforcement of her federal rights,2
and her otherwise paramount civil rights become a subsidiary con-
cern to that of administrative efficiency.3
Administrative agencies exist to promote efficiency in govern-
ment.4 Despite the utility of administrative proceedings, the im-
1. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 111 (1991) (predict-
ing the effects where state agency determinations are given preclusive effect).
2. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 494 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (explaining that the Kremer ruling forecloses the possibility of Title VII re-
lief). After an adverse administrative determination, the only possible remedy lies in
state judicial review, contrary to the Congressional intent behind Title VII. Id. at 494
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing the ramifications of the Kremer Court's ruling).
Cf. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 501 U.S. at 111 (declaring subsequent federal
proceedings "strictly pro forma" if state administrative agency findings enjoyed
preclusive effect).
3. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (concluding that both
Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) contain
provisions "intended to screen from the federal courts those discrimination com-
plaints that might be settled to the satisfaction of the grievant in state proceedings").
But see CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW xi (1990) (remarking that
there is no constitutional, statutory, or common-law guarantee that administrative
agencies will make good decisions).
4. Marjorie A. Silver, In Lieu Of Preclusion: Reconciling Administrative Deci-
sionmaking and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. L.J. 367, 375-76 (1990) (providing
background on the purpose of agency adjudications). Professor Silver goes on to note
that many disputes which would otherwise form the basis of successful civil rights suits
can be resolved at the local agency level. Id. at 375-76 (noting the benefits of the
administrative process). See also Erika Geetter, Attorney's Fees For § 1983 Claims in
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portance and necessity of administrative tribunals must also be
examined in light of the atavistic concern the agency has in the
outcome of each case before them.5 Administrators, whose func-
tion includes administering and implementing a stated legislative
purpose, make administrative determinations, not judges.6 Admin-
istrative Law Judges (ALJs), therefore, do not adopt the judicial
attitude of impartiality, but "rather the attitude of an executive
who wants to get a job done."7 Every search for the truth, and
every effort at compensating the wronged party must be tempered
toward accomplishing the agency's legislative charter. 8 To this end,
some agencies have evidenced everything from antipathy to out-
right discouragement of participation by outside counsel.9 Simply
put, agencies are parties in interest to the very proceedings they
conduct. 10
Fair Hearings: Rethinking Current Jurisprudence, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1267, 1273 (1988)
(demonstrating that various claims traditionally raised in state agency fair hearing
proceedings may also serve to support § 1983 actions).
5. Randy J. Hart, Note, Administrative Res Judicata in Ohio: A Suggestion For
the Future, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 595, 605 (1989) (acknowledging judiciary's fear of
institutional bias conflict in administrative proceedings). See also FRANK E. COOPER,
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 20-21 (1982) (relating the potential for
agency "excess of zeal" over its own interests to conflict with concerns of fairness and
impartiality); ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
264 (1979) (noting that administrative agencies must act as both a legislative and adju-
dicatory power).
6. Hart, supra note 5, at 619 (explaining that because state agencies do not ad-
dress the same policy concerns as the judiciary, their decisions are likewise based on
different standards). See also COOPER, supra note 5, at 223 (distinguishing judicial
decision-making from that of administrative tribunals).
7. COOPER, supra note 5, at 223 (recognizing that while administrative judges use
the same tools as their judicial counterparts, they utilize these tools in vastly different
ways). See also EDLEY, supra note 3 (contrasting the procedural aspects of adminis-
trative adjudication with its substantive effects).
8. Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV.
329, 335 (1991) (describing policy-making by courts as incidental to the decisions of
the cases, unlike the policy-making objectives of agencies). See also RABIN, supra
note 5, at 264 (noting that the administrative agency's unique task is to both make
rules and to decide cases); COOPER, supra note 5, at 223 (recognizing that in light of
their legislative imperatives, "agencies must depart from the normal standards of de-
cision that guide the courts"). "This dual capacity creates a real tension .. " RABIN,
supra note 5, at 264 (discussing the realities involved when an administrative agency
seeks to both legislate and adjudicate).
9. COOPER, supra note 5, at 221 (characterizing the resentment some agencies
harbor toward assistance of counsel in light of the agency's professed expertise in the
disputed area). See also SILVER, supra note 4 at 376 (expressing concern over the fact
that many litigants in agency proceedings are not represented by counsel).
10. Bruff, supra note 8, at 334-35 (arguing that administrative law de-emphasizes
the importance of a neutral tribunal). The tension inherent in administrative law be-
tween the need for expertise and the "introduction of unacceptable levels of bias"
The agency's conflict of interest is further underscored by the
broad scope of discretion afforded to AL's."1 The trend in agency
decision-making has seen an increase in the use of the "fair" or
"reasonable" paradigm, also known as "administrative absolu-
tism."' 2 This rule of discretion is particularly troubling in light of
the seeming lack of controls used to determine what in fact is "fair"
or "reasonable.' 13
into the adjudicatory process has existed for centuries, and is not likely to end soon.
Id. at 334 (addressing the need for balance within the administrative adjudicatory
process). See also COOPER, supra note 5, at 21 (noting that the fundamental differ-
ences between administrative and judicial procedures are due to the fact that agencies
are normally parties in interest to the proceedings).
11. COOPER, supra note 5, at 21 (examining the role of administrative discretion
in agency adjudications). See also EDLEY, supra note 3, at 5 (intimating that adminis-
trative agency discretion is far more sweeping than traditional executive discretion).
The deference afforded an agency determination is never more dramatic than when
considered in a military context, where the military's important mission is often used
to justify otherwise impermissible civil rights violations. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986) (refusing to overturn Air Force discharge of rabbi for wearing
his yarmulke indoors in violation of military headgear standards).
12. COOPER, supra note 5, at 21 (explaining the administrative decision-making
process and its tendency toward substituting the administrative law judge's discretion
for the rule of law).
13. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984) (holding that courts must follow any reasonable agency interpretation of stat-
utes administered by that agency); COOPER, supra note 5, at 21 (emphasizing that
agencies are often the sole arbiters of what constitutes reasonableness or fairness in
the specific instance); EDLEY, supra note 3, at 5 (criticizing the enormous policy and
law-making powers of "unelected bureaucrats"). In addition, there is a tendency to
settle all procedural disputes according to considerations of the agency's convenience.
COOPER, supra note 5, at 23 (demonstrating the role agency priorities play in adjudi-
cations). Even more prejudicial to the non-agency party is the fact that each decision
is made according to the individual and unique merits of the case, permitting frequent
and substantial departures from previous decisional precedence in the interest of ex-
pedience. Id. (noting the lapses in predictability that often occur in the administrative
context). The judiciary is locked in a perpetual struggle to determine exactly how
much deference is due an agency decision, with case law increasingly littered with
exceptions to the reasonable interpretation rule. Accord Timothy B. Dyk & David
Schenck, Exceptions to Chevron, ADMIN. L. NEWS 1993, at 1 (distinguishing three
broad categories for judicial interpretation exceptions to the traditional rule of rea-
sonable agency interpretation: 1) exceptions that ensure that the judiciary does not
defer to an agency on an issue actually within the scope of judicial power, 2) excep-
tions when Congressional intent demonstrating desired judicial deference to agency
decisions is lacking, and 3) exceptions that prevent courts from deferring to agency
decisions that appear to have been motivated by expediency, rendering them less than
trustworthy). These three post-Chevron bases for judicial deference exceptions ap-
pear, however, merely to be reincarnations of established judicial deference doctrine,
specifically judicial deference to executive actions. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Def-
erence to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 972-75 (1992) (listing factors to be
considered by courts, including support for agency's decision in statute's language and
history, the agency's authority to promulgate regulations, the consistency of the
agency decision as compared to previous agency pronouncements, the technical com-
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This Comment addresses the history and intent behind adminis-
trative law and agency decision-making, and examines the differ-
ences between administrative proceedings and their judicial
counterparts. Part II explains the history and effect of claim pre-
clusion. Part III discusses the foundations of Administrative Law.
Part IV reviews the Supreme Court's treatment of the preclusive
effects of unreviewed agency determinations in civil rights cases,
with particular focus on civil rights cases arising under Title VII,
the ADEA, and § 1983. Part V addresses the necessity and impor-
tance of judicial review of administrative agency findings. Part VI
reviews the history and purpose of the civil rights movement. Fi-
nally, Part VII argues that the three statutes should be treated
equally for preclusion purposes in light of the original Congres-
sional intent of upholding civil rights and the continuing impor-
tance of civil rights enforcement. Specifically, this Comment
proposes that each unreviewed § 1983 administrative adjudication
receive protection under the same umbrella as its constitutional
cousins, Title VII and the ADEA, and exempt these adjudications
from preclusive effects in subsequent federal proceedings.
Because of Congress's increased reliance on administrative adju-
dication to resolve civil rights-related disputes, concerns arise
about the applicability of claim and issue preclusion principles to
this still emerging area of the law. 4 Claim preclusion is the judicial
method used to confirm that a litigant had his or her day in court,
and the court fully adjudicated his or her claim.15 Because admin-
plexity of the subject, and whether the decision was founded on the agency's expertise
in the technical field).
14. E.g., Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 501 U.S. at 113-14 (ruling that unre-
viewed state agency age discrimination decisions are not entitled to preclusive effect);
Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798-99 (1986) (awarding preclusive effects to
fact finding of unreviewed state administrative tribunals in § 1983 actions, but declin-
ing to impose such a limitation on Title VII discrimination claims); Kremer v. Chem.
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982) (affirming district court's grant of preclusion
to judicially reviewed agency decision rejecting employee's Title VII discrimination
claim); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 762 (1979) (declaring that "state
procedural defaults cannot foreclose federal relief and that state limitations periods
cannot govern the efficacy of the federal remedy" in support of its holding that unre-
viewed ADEA determinations do not preclude subsequent federal claims).
15. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979) (naming traditional
principals behind claim preclusion: saving parties cost of multiple lawsuits, conserving
judicial resources, and encouraging reliance on adjudication by preventing inconsis-
tent decisions). See also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980) (stating that "res
judicata and collateral estoppel not only reduce unnecessary litigation and foster reli-
ance on adjudication, but also promote comity between state and federal courts that
has been recognized as a bulwark of the federal system").
istrative agencies often have narrow legislatively defined jurisdic-
tional authority, blanket application of claim preclusion to
unreviewed administrative decisions is especially unwise.16
Of the enormous body of administrative law, one area spawning
considerable controversy is the claim preclusion effect of unre-
viewed state administrative decisions. 17 Three common subjects of
dispute and confusion are the Age Discrimination in Employment.
Act of 1967 (ADEA), Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In University of Tennessee v. Elliott,1 8 the United States Supreme
Court examined the issue-preclusive effects of unreviewed state
administrative Title VII and § 1983 decisions. 19 The Elliott Court
held that Congress did not intend Title VII administrative decisions
to have issue-preclusive effects in federal court in light of the lan-
guage directing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to give "substantial weight" to the decisions of state or
local authorities.2 ° The Elliott Court also considered 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, the full faith and credit statute guaranteeing adjudications
by state courts the same deference in federal courts as that enjoyed
16. Accord United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)
(articulating three fairness requirements for unreviewed administrative decisions:
first, the administrative agency acted in a judicial capacity; second, the agency re-
solved issues properly before it; and third, the parties had an adequate opportunity to
litigate); Silver, supra note 4, at 375 (listing agencies that, while not allowed to hear
actual civil rights claims, are allowed to make determinations that may impact an
individual's civil rights). "Such agencies include . . . unemployment compensation
boards and disciplinary boards that determine whether an individual was dismissed
from employment for cause[,] ... school disciplinary boards that determine whether a
student should or should not be suspended or expelled from school[,] . . . licensing
boards that determine whether the license of a professional (or driver) should be
revoked." Id. (explaining how agencies not actually charged with enforcing civil
rights nevertheless make decisions impacting them).
17. E.g., Lead Indus. Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 647 F.2d 1130, 1173-74 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (stating that "a reviewing court owes no deference to the agency's pro-
nouncement on a constitutional question"); Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 780-81
(5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a court must make an independent judgment on the
constitutionality of an agency's actions, regardless of the agency's expertise in that
area); Kelly E. Henriksen, Gays, The Military, and Judicial Deference: When the
Courts Must Reclaim Equal Protection as Their Area of Expertise, 9 ADMIN. L.J. Am.
U. 1273, 1281 (1996) (noting that discretion may not be conferred on an agency by
Congress if it results in violations of an individual's constitutional rights).
18. 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
19. Id., at 788 (considering claim preclusion as applied to Title VII and § 1983
claims).
20. Id. at 795 (declaring that it would be nonsensical for Congress to award more
power to administrative agency decisions than to EEOC).
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in a state's own courts.21 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 was deemed appli-
cable in only those instances where the statutory language did not
indicate Congressional intent to the contrary.22 Unlike the lan-
guage of Title VII, the Elliott Court determined that § 1983 of the
civil rights act evinced no Congressional intent to contravene the
federal common-law rules of issue preclusion.23
Notwithstanding, however, the Supreme Court's ruling in Elliott,
wherein the Court held that the fact finding results of unreviewed
state administrative agencies did not have preclusive effect in sub-
sequent Title VII claims, but did have such preclusive effects on
claims brought under Reconstruction civil rights statutes,24 the cir-
cuit courts remain split as to whether claim preclusion applies to
unreviewed administrative agency decisions.2 1 Subsequently, crea-
21. Miagra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 85 (1984) (obli-
gating federal courts to grant state court decisions claim preclusion effect).
22. Id. at 797 (recognizing Congressional intent to apply federal common-law
claim preclusion principles to § 1983 actions).
23. Id. (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1980)). But see Robert P.
Morris, How Many Bites Are Enough? The Supreme Court's Decision in University of
Tennessee v. Elliott, 55 TENN. L. REV. 205, 245-48 (1988) (arguing that the general rule
of preclusion fashioned by the Elliott Court directly contradicts the Court's finding
that § 1738 is inapplicable to § 1983 claims). Morris notes that the requirements listed
in Elliott that supposedly prompt application of federal common-law administrative
preclusion are essentially the same conditions imposed under § 1738, which the Court
deemed inapplicable to § 1983 claims in light its of statutory construction. Id. (paral-
leling § 1738 conditions for preclusion with those created after § 1738 was ruled in-
consistent with Congressional intent).
24. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799 (affirming in part and reversing in part the Court of
Appeals decision).
25. Compare DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated, Slekis v.
Thomas, 525 U.S. 1098 (1999) (declining to impose an exhaustion requirement on
§ 1983 claims that would force claimants to bring all claims before state administrative
official or risk claim preclusion); G.V.V. Rao v. County of Fairfax Virginia, 108 F.3d
42, 45-46 (4th Cir. 1997) (refusing to give preclusive effect to unreviewed administra-
tive Title VII decision); Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 815 F.2d 641, 646-47 (11th
Cir. 1987) (holding that because the state administrative agency was not the proper
forum to hear ADEA claims, claimant's failure to litigate ADEA claim did not act to
bar future federal causes of action); Duggan v. Bd. of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1297 (7th
Cir. 1987) (declining application of preclusion principles to unreviewed ADEA-based
administrative adjudications); Rosenfeld v. Dep't of the Army, 769 F.2d 237, 240 (4th
Cir. 1985) (holding that judicially unreveiwed state administrative agency decisions
should not be accorded preclusive effect to subsequent federal claims), with Miller v.
County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying federal common-
law claim preclusion to § 1983 decisions); Stillians v. Iowa, 843 F.2d 276, 282-83 (8th
Cir. 1988), abrogated, Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104
(1991) (giving unreviewed state administrative decisions preclusive effect under the
ADEA); Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated,
Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991) (allowing that judi-
cially unreviewed administrative decisions may enjoy preclusive effects under lan-
guage of ADEA).
tion of a coherent and cohesive rubric for uniform application
failed in light of the perceived differences between both the stat-
utes' purposes and their legislative intent. 6
II. CLAIM PRECLUSION: WHAT IS IT AND WHEN DOES
IT APPLY?
The general rule of claim preclusion is that a judgment on the
merits in one suit bars a subsequent suit between the same parties
based on the same cause of action.27 Though closely related,28 is-
sue preclusion prevents relitigation of issues that were both fully
determined and necessary to the outcome of the earlier proceed-
ing.29 Under a strict interpretation, claim preclusion is often con-
26. Accord Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 501 U.S. at 109-10 (noting that the
suitability of claim preclusion varies according to the specific rights at stake, the
power of the administrative agency, and the adequacy of agency procedures); Elliott,
478 U.S. at 795-96 (citing Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 848 (1976) in support
of the Elliott Court's interpretation of Title VII legislative intent, but citing Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1980) in support of the absence of such § 1983 legislative
intent). Compare Duggan, 818 F.2d at 1296 (finding enough parallels between Title
VII and the ADEA to treat them identically for preclusion purposes), with Stillians,
843 F.2d at 281 (allowing that "the ADEA more closely parallels Title VII than
§ 1983" when considering the preclusive effects of unreviewed state administrative
ADEA determinations).
27. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) (defining the
doctrine of claim preclusion). Phrased differently, precluding a claim means "that a
party ordinarily may not assert a civil claim arising from a transaction with respect to
which he has prosecuted such a claim, whether or not the two claims wholly corre-
spond to each other." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 (describing the
prohibitive nature of claim preclusion). See also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326
(discussing the effects of judgments on original and counter claims, as well as the
scope of claims).
28. The two terms are often used interchangeably (and incorrectly) by courts and
practitioners alike. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS § 4 (1982) (noting that
the liberal use of the term res judicata has led to its persistent misuse). However,
both claim and issue preclusion "shar[e] the common goals of judicial economy, pre-
dictability, and freedom from harassment .... Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116
(3d Cir. 1988), citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Work of Professor Allan Delker Ves-
tal, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 13, 20 (1984) (explaining the close relationship between the pre-
clusion doctrines).
29. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326 n.5 (distinguishing issue preclusion because
the subsequent claim is based on a separate cause of action, despite the shared issues
in controversy). An interesting variation on queries of administrative preclusion can
be seen in a case to which the United States Supreme Court recently remanded.
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. granted in part
by 525 U.S. 808 (1998), and vacated by 526 U.S. 795 (1999), on remand to 195 F.3d 803
(5th Cir. 1999). On remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, Cleveland involved an employee (Cleveland) of Policy Management Systems
Corporation (PMSC) who took a leave of absence after suffering a stroke while on
the job. Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 514 (describing the events giving rise to the litigation).
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sidered the more drastic of the two preclusion doctrines because it
forces plaintiffs to raise all possible claims for relief and all desired
remedies in the initial proceeding.30 Before a court will impose this
As a result of her stroke, Cleveland suffered from aphasia and had difficulty with her
concentration, memory, speaking, reading, and spelling skills. Id. Because of her in-
ability to work, Cleveland applied for and received social security disability benefits
until her eventual return to work. See id. Upon returning to PMSC, Cleveland re-
quested various accommodations as she was not yet fully recovered, including "com-
puter training, permission to take work home in the evenings, [and] a transfer of
position" each of which PMSC denied. Id. at 515. Three months after her return to
work, Cleveland was terminated for poor performance, causing her to become de-
pressed and aggravating her aphasia, both of which prompted her to renew her re-
quest for social security disability benefits. Id. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
reviewing the request concluded that Cleveland was disabled at the time of her stroke
and remained so at the time of the AL's decision, and was, therefore, entitled to
disability benefits retroactive to the date of the stroke. Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 515
(reporting ALJ's determination of Cleveland's claims). Before the ALJ rendered the
decision, Cleveland filed a claim of wrongful termination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act against PMSC, alleging that she was a qualified individual with a disa-
bility who was denied reasonable accommodations necessary to allow her to perform
her essential job functions. Id. The Cleveland court noted that the ADA requires an
employee to be able to meet the requirements of their specific position, while the SSA
requires that the person be completely unable to work. Id. at 517 (comparing requi-
site levels of incapacitation of the SSA and ADA statutes). Judge Wiener, writing for
the Court of Appeals, said that while a social security disability claim does not en-
tirely preclude a cause of action based on the ADA, the social security claim does
create a rebuttable presumption. Id. at 518 (hesitating to apply a blanket rule of judi-
cial estoppel to Cleveland's claim). But see Blanton v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 108 F.3d
104, 108-09 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff's claims under the SSA prevent
future claims under the ADA); McNemar v. The Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617-
18 (3d Cir. 1996) (estopping plaintiff from asserting ADA claim in light of prior social
security request); Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 606 (9th
Cir. 1996) (basing judicial preclusion estoppel on plaintiff's previous assertion that she
was unable to work); DeGuiseppe v. Vill. of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 192 (7th Cir.
1995) (using plaintiff's complete disability claim to estop subsequent accommodations
denial claim); August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 584 (1st Cir. 1992)
(treating social security disability application as binding admission of employee's sta-
tus, thus eliminating the need to revisit the issue); Beauford v. Father Flanagan's
Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1987) (refusing to allow plaintiff who had
admitted an inability to perform essential job functions a claim for relief under the
Federal Rehabilitation Act). The Fifth Circuit ruled that Cleveland failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to rebut the presumption of her inability to
work created by her SSA claim, thereby estopping her from pursuing her ADA claim.
Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 518 (enforcing judicial preclusion principles in the absence of
an adequate rebuttal). In Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795 (1999), the Supreme Court held
that: (1) claims for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits and for ADA
damages did not inherently conflict; and (2) the employee was entitled to an opportu-
nity to explain a discrepancy between her statement in pursuing SSDI benefits that
she was totally disabled and her ADA claim that she could perform essential func-
tions of her job.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 (1982) (contrasting the effects
of claim preclusion with issue preclusion); 18 STEVEN WRIGHT, ET AL, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4408, at 64-65 (1981) (comparing claim and issue pre-
severe consequence, however, claim preclusion requires that the
litigant have a full and fair opportunity to litigate any and all po-
tential claims. 1
Additionally, Congressional intent plays a role in whether a fed-
eral court will preclude a claim.32 Many statutes require complain-
ants first to file a claim with the appropriate agency authority
before allowing the claim to be heard in federal court.33 The
preclusive effect of the agency's administrative decision becomes
an issue when the claimant either chooses to forego review by a
state district court, or there is no such judicial review available.34
clusion doctrines). See also Tonka Corp. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 200,
210 (D.N.J. 1993) ("[t]he term res judicata has been given a variety of meanings, some
of which incorporate the distinct concept of collateral estoppel").
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26, cmt. c (1982) (recognizing the
inherent unfairness of penalizing a litigant for failure to seek unified disposition when
the claims could not, in fact, have been combined due to jurisdictional limitations).
See also Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 418-19 (declaring as final only those agency deter-
minations made within the scope of the agency's authority).
32. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (re-
vealing that "the question is not whether administrative estoppel is wise but whether
it is intended by the legislature"); Elliott, 478 U.S. at 793-97 (rejecting assertion that
Congress intended federal courts to be bound by administrative Title VII decisions,
but fashioning a rule of preclusion in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982) (requiring grievants to first file discrimination
claims arising under the ADEA with the EEOC). See also Kremer v. Chem. Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 469 (1982) (allowing an aggrieved party to present his or her case
before the EEOC only after allowing the appropriate state agency to first attempt
resolution); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1979) (ruling that
under the ADEA, resorting to available administrative agency remedies is mandatory
and not optional for claimants alleging age discrimination). It is only after complying
with such remedy exhaustion requirements that a claimant may file a state or federal
claim. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a)(d) (1994) (requiring hearing before appropriate agency
before filing claim in federal court). States differ in terms of their deferral status; in a
deferral state, the state administrative agency responsible for handling employment
discrimination adjudicates the claim. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.9 (1988) (authorizing referral
of civil rights-based claims to and from state agencies). In a non-deferral state, the
EEOC hears the claim because the state does not have an adequate state agency. 29
U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982) (providing that termination of proceedings with the appropri-
ate state agency allows the claim to proceed to the federal administrative level). Re-
gardless of a state's deferral status, there is at least a sixty-day (60-day) investigatory
period, during which time the claimant is prohibited from filing a civil action in state
or federal court. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1982) (mandating a waiting period to allow
for administrative investigation). If the EEOC (in non-deferral states) initiates litiga-
tion, the claimant loses the right to file suit entirely. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (showing
that if the federal administrative agency decides to pursue the claim on the plaintiff's
behalf, that plaintiff may lose all ability to enforce their civil rights).
34. Accord Kremer, 456 U.S. at 469 (recognizing that no portion of Title VII
operates to force claimants to pursue an unfavorable state administrative decision in
state court); Assoc. Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Irving, 610 F.2d 1221, 1224-25
(4th Cir. 1979) (ruling National Labor Relations Board's refusal to file complaint un-
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Legislative Intent. Definition and Goals of
Administrative Law
Administrative law is the legal branch that controls the adminis-
trative functions of the government by ensuring that agencies exer-
cise their powers within their legal limits, while additionally
protecting citizens against any abuse of agency powers.35 Congress
and state legislatures promulgate and define the administrative
agency as strictly a legislative creature, 36 "including all those
branches of public law relating to the organization of governmental
administration."37 Therefore, any regulatory or rulemaking au-
thority is derived solely from the agency's legislative mandate.38
reviewable). "When administrative action is fully reviewable, a court may decide
questions of (1) constitutionality, (2) jurisdiction, (3) fraud on the tribunal, (4) arbi-
trariness or capriciousness, (5) legality, and (6) substantial evidence to support find-
ings of fact...." 5 KENNETH C. DAVIS & JOHN P. WILSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 257 (2d ed. 1984) (listing the issues prompting judicial review of administra-
tive tribunal determinations). Davis points out the common misconception by the
courts that reviewability is a distinct, static concept. Id. at 258 (explaining that despite
jurisdictional or other traditional bars to review, a court may elect to allow judicial
review of an agency decision on a specific, compelling question). Courts may elect to
carve out review categories for otherwise unreviewable administrative determina-
tions. Id. (sampling potential exceptions to unreviewable determinations, such as
"unreviewable except on constitutional ... questions" or "unreviewable unless clearly
arbitrary or beyond the agency's jurisdiction"). Cf. JEFFEREY L. JOWELL, LAW AND
BUREAUCRACY 28 (1975) (recognizing that the existence of a right does not guarantee
that it will be given adequate protection). Jowell further notes:
A welfare recipient, for example, who has the procedural right to appeal the
decision of a caseworker, might be told by the appeals referee that what she
is asserting does not exist. In other words, she may be told through the exer-
cise of her procedural right that in fact she has no substantive right.
JEFFEREY L. JOWELL, LAW AND BUREAUCRACY 28 (1975) (proffering an example
demonstrating the defects of agency adjudication).
35. JOHN W. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (6th ed. 1988) (attempting to de-
fine the nebulous area of administrative law).
36. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 n.18
(1982) (recognizing Congress's power to create administrative agencies to aid in gov-
ernance). See also Bevans v. Indust. Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(declaring judicial review of statutorily created agency powers appropriate).
37. Silver, supra note 4, at 375-76 (explaining the purpose of agency adjudica-
tions); COOPER, supra note 5, at 4 (defining the scope and purpose of administrative
law).
38. Tex. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Tex. 1994) (declaring that
administrative agencies are legislative creations endowed with only the powers neces-
sary to carry out their duties); BERNARD K. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10 (3d
ed. 1991) (explaining that agencies are restricted to activities explicitly or implicitly
authorized by legislature). Cf Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron
Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283 (1986) (observing that Congress often legislates a
Likewise, any and all agency adjudicatory authority stems from the
same legislative source.39 The field of administrative adjudication
is often viewed as including "little courts" and "little legislatures,"
each acting in furtherance of the individual agency's legislative
orders. 40
B. Benefits and Purposes of Administrative Adjudication
One of the purported benefits of administrative agency law is the
efficiency with which the agency is able to "polic[e] the minutiae
... in designated field[s]" with a view toward preventing large-
scale deviations from proscribed conduct.4 1 Another inherent ad-
vantage to the administrative process is the agency's continuity of
experience and attention to specialized areas of regulation.42 Fur-
thermore, the relief administrative agencies provide to the court
system is a motivating factor for expanding the scope of the agen-
cies' powers. 43 For example, agency adjudications provide an op-
portunity for parties to present evidence to a decision-making
broad agency mandate such as "to clean up the environment, to monitor the banking
system, or to improve worker safety").
39. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67 n.18 (stating that "Congress' power to create leg-
islative courts to adjudicate public rights carries with it the lesser power to create
administrative agencies").
40. MARTIN FORKOSCH, A TREATISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 204 (1956) (ex-
plaining that administrative agencies exist to effectuate the policies deemed important
by the legislature); COOPER, supra note 5, at 4 (outlining the powers of administrative
tribunals).
41. COOPER, supra note 5, at 14 (recognizing the government's compelling need
to have administrative agencies enforce its mandates).
42. City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 609 S.W.2d 574, 579 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980) (giving large degree of latitude to agencies created to centralize expertise
in certain regulatory area); COOPER, supra note 5, at 15 (1982) (lauding the use of
more flexible administrative agencies to react to changing social conditions); Silver,
supra note 4, at 375-76 (admitting that the creation of agencies "allows development
of expertise in the agencies' particular fields").
43. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (concluding that both
Title VII and the ADEA "intended to screen from the federal courts those discrimi-
nation complaints that might be settled ... in state proceedings"); Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 56-57 (1932) (noting the "utility and convenience of administrative agen-
cies for the investigation and findings of facts within their proper province"); COOPER,
supra note 5, at 19 (recognizing the potential flood of litigation the court system
would face if confronted with each and every workmen's compensation claim or social
security dispute); Silver, supra note 4, at 375-76 (acknowledging that agency expertise
often means a "speedier resolution" of disputes than if left to the courts).
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entity." While Congress created the administrative animal to as-
sist, it did not intend to replace the judicial system.45
The primary purpose of administrative adjudication is to allow a
more expedient method for settling disputes than if the claim was
heard in a court of law.46 In effect, resolution at the administrative
level is not only expedient and less expensive, but also allows state
agencies the first opportunity to tackle state law-based disputes.47
Administrative adjudication allows agencies to develop expertise in
the agency's particular field,48 but often at the expense of the for-
malities guaranteed in federal or state courts.49 In addition, there
are agencies whose primary concern is civil rights enforcement.
However, there are far more agencies whose seemingly non-civil
rights-based decisions can impact a party's civil rights.50
44. Silver, supra note 4, at 375 (chronicling the steps in an agency adjudication
and defining "agency adjudication" as "a process that more or less resembles judicial
adjudication"). See also Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1267, 1274 (1975) (demonstrating the different procedural interpretations of a
"hearing").
45. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975) (remarking on Con-
gressional intent to allow victims of employment discrimination a choice between ad-
ministrative and judicial remedies).
46. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56-57 (1932) (emphasizing the benefits of
administrative proceedings). See also COOPER, supra note 5, at 19 (recognizing the
assistance that administrative proceedings provide the judiciary); Silver, supra note 4,
at 375-76 (acknowledging that agency expertise often results in a "speedier resolu-
tion" of disputes).
47. Silver, supra note 4, at 376-77 (providing rationale for administrative mecha-
nisms). See also Erika Geetter, Comment, Attorney's Fees For § 1983 Claims in Fair
Hearings: Rethinking Current Jurisprudence, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1267, 1272-73 (1988)(arguing that claims successfully resolved at the state level need never materialize into
§ 1983 claims).
48. Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L.
REV. 329, 330 (1991) (noting that "specialized judges can become expert in the ...
issues surrounding particular programs" and agencies are better able to "gather the
necessary information and to send signals that will register"); Silver, supra note 4, at
375-76 (explaining that administrative agencies specialize in certain areas, facilitating
resolution of disputes in these areas).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982) (requiring agencies to first attempt to elimi-
nate discrimination through "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and per-
suasion"); Silver, supra note 4, at 375-76 (disparaging administrative proceedings in
civil rights cases because of their informality); Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and
Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 482, 499-500 (1987) (lambasting civil rights legislation for allowing violators
to come into compliance with statutes using informal agency proceedings rather than
providing true reparation of the claimant's injury through more formal judicial
means).
50. Silver, supra note 4, at 375 (1990) (providing examples of agencies that make
decisions impacting civil rights). For example, an employer who refuses to pay the
claimant's desired workers' compensation benefits and successfully defends such with-
holding at an administrative hearing, precludes the plaintiff employee from bringing a
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C. Recognition of Administrative Adjudicative Power
In 1932, the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in
Crowell v. Benson,51 recognized the adjudicative powers of admin-
istrative agencies for the first time.5 2 In Crowell, the Court permit-
ted administrative determinations in cases involving individual
rights and liabilities, as long as the legislature made provisions for
judicial review.53 The Court, however, was unwilling to give res
judicata effect to administrative agency decisions.54
Prior to 1940, the Supreme Court viewed an administrative de-
termination as an executive branch mechanism, consequently it
was not a candidate for preclusion principles.55 Prompted by a
challenge to the constitutionality of the Bituminous Coal Conser-
vation Act of 1935, the Court began to shift the treatment of ad-
ministrative adjudications.56
The Supreme Court, in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Ad-
kins,-7 ruled in part, on the validity of an agency determination as
to whether the appellant's mining activities fell under the provi-
federal claim under § 1983. Geetter, supra note 4, at 1273 (concluding that an adverse
administrative decision could serve as the state action basis for a § 1983 claim, but
which would currently be precluded from federal court enforcement). Accord Morris,
supra note 23, at 243-44 (demonstrating an instance where a the administrative out-
come of a nonconstitutional grievance can have civil rights implications).
51. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
52. Id. at 57.
53. Id. at 64-65 (granting administrative agencies jurisdiction to decide issues of
liability among individuals, subject to any provisions for judicial review required by
Congress). See also BERNARD K. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW II (3d ed. 1991)
(interpreting Crowell to stand for the proposition that agencies may act in a judicial
capacity provided there is "the ultimate constitutional safeguard [of] judicial review");
PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 53 (1994) (declaring the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) the "fundamental charter of the admin-
istrative state"). The APA's design affords procedural protection to those with inter-
ests decided by agencies. Id. (terming the APA a "quasi-constitutional" statute,
aimed at implementing Fifth Amendment due process safeguards); Martin Shapiro,
APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 455 (1986) (likening the APA to a
constitution because "today [it] means all kinds of things that its drafters could not
possibly have intended...").
54. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-03 (1932) (hold-
ing preclusion principles applicable to administrative adjudications). See generally
Hart, supra note 5, at 605 (reporting the effect of Sunshine Anthracite Court's
decision).
55. Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 285 (1906) (declaring administrative
agency decisions to be treated as executive branch decisions).
56. Sunshine Anthracite, 310 U.S. at 387 (characterizing the basic problem faced
by the Court as "the Constitutionality of the Act").
57. 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
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sions of the federal statute.58 In Sunshine Anthracite, the National
Bituminous Coal Commission, a federal administrative agency,
ruled that the Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company (Sunshine) was
subject to the price-fixing scheme and taxation measures of the Bi-
tuminous Coal Conservation Act.5 9 Sunshine's appeal of the Com-
mission's exemption denial was challenged on res judicata
grounds, 6 a challenge that the Supreme Court tentatively upheld
after determining that the Commission acted within its authority.61
It was years later, in the seminal case of United States v. Utah
Construction & Mining Co.,62 before the Court fully accepted the
application of preclusion principles to administrative decisions.63
Utah Construction involved a breach of contract claim between
Utah Construction & Mining Company and the Atomic Energy
Commission, 64 and the subsequent challenge of the Advisory
Board of Contract Appeals administrative ruling.65 In applying ad-
ministrative claim preclusion to the Board's findings, the Utah
Construction Court articulated three requirements to which future
courts look to when determining whether to apply claim preclusion
to administrative determinations.66 The Utah Construction Court
stated in part: "When an administrative agency is acting in a judi-
cial capacity and resolve[s] disputed issues of fact properly before
58. Id. at 390 (summarizing the appellant's claims that it should be exempt from
the Act's regulation and taxation).
59. Id. at 390-91 (relating the Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of
law).
60. Id. at 391 (providing the case's procedural history).
61. Id. at 403 (upholding the lower court's refusal of jurisdiction on res judicatagrounds based on the Commission's delegated power to rule in such instances). See
also id. at 400 (explaining that "[t]he functions of the courts cease when.. .the findings
of the Commission meet the statutory test" outlined in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United
States, 307 U.S. 125, 146 (1939)). The Rochester Telephone test of a "rational basis for
the conclusions approved by the administrative body" would later prove insufficient
for administrative res judicata purposes, prompting the courts to employ the more
streamlined Utah Construction three-part test. Id. (finding that the court "travel[ed]
beyond its province" in reviewing the agency determination). See also United States
v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (narrowing the test for administrativepreclusion to only three elements, rather than the broader inquiry of whether preclu-
sion would be "harmonious with the general principles of collateral estoppel").
62. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
63. Id. at 422 (finding that when an agency is acting in a judicial capacity, resolv-ing issues properly before it, and giving the parties adequate opportunity to litigate,
administrative claim preclusion applies).
64. Id. at 400.
65. Id. at 400-01.
66. Id. at 422 (noting that when: (1) an agency acts in a judicial capacity; (2) to
resolve issues properly before it; and (3) the parties have a full opportunity to litigate,
the courts shall apply administrative res judicata).
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it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,
the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce re-
pose."67 Although some legal commentators argue that this state-
ment was mere dicta as opposed to a definitive set of criteria,
68
lower federal and state courts routinely utilize this language when
applying claim preclusion to agency decisions.
D. Differences Between Administrative and Court Proceedings
1. Procedural Deficiencies
There are many differences between administrative adjudica-
tions and judicial proceedings that counsel against allowing preclu-
sion of administrative decisions in subsequent federal civil rights
claims.7 ° One such difference is that many state agencies do not
67. Id. at 421-22.
68. See infra Part IV. See also Rex R. Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Es-
toppel: Limiting the Preclusive Effect of Administrative Determinations in Judicial Pro-
ceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 422, 426 (1983) (suggesting that the administrative
preclusion language in University of Tennessee v. Elliott should not be deemed dispos-
itive). But see Morris, supra note 23, at 250 (criticizing the rubric in University of
Tennessee v. Elliott for failing to include an additional question of the administrative
agency's adequacy as a substitute for a federal trial when deciding whether to apply
administrative preclusion to that agency's decision).
69. See infra Part IV.
70. Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity
and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J.
163, 186 (1984) (comparing the institutional purposes of courts and agencies). "Char-
acteristically, courts adjudicate the rights and obligations of disputants on the basis of
principled justifications and distinctions derived from previously adopted legal
norms" while regulatory agencies are engines of "continuous social policy formation
and implementation." Id. (contrasting the dominant objectives and methods of courts
versus administrative agencies). Schuck also observes:
Although obliged to render neutral, principled decisions with respect to indi-
vidual disputes brought before it, an agency's principal purpose is to effectu-
ate an externally created but bureaucratically internalized legislative
purpose, usually the protection of certain collective values or group interests
.... This orientation encourages agencies systematically to undervalue par-
ticularized justice in favor of the social interests and policy goals that they
are required to pursue through their regulatory programs. These interests
and goals usually transcend those of the particular parties before them.
Id. at 187 (noting the seemingly inescapable bias in agency decision making). But cf
id. at 188 (remarking on the irony that agencies, though granted extensive discretion,
tend to make inflexible rules, while courts, which typically eschew discretion, hand
down "tractable, malleable rules"). The diverse nature of administrative tribunals
makes reliable application of general concepts difficult as well. E.g., Thomas v. Wash.
Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 283 (1980) (denying application of res judicata to Vir-
ginia Workers' Compensation Commission award in light of the Commission's limited
jurisdiction); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799 (1973) (refusing
to find EEOC ruling of no reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred bind-
ing on federal court because of the nonadversarial character of EEOC proceedings);
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furnish written or published opinions of their hearings. 71 Further-
more, both state and federal court proceedings allow parties to pre-
sent and challenge all relevant evidence and information to an
impartial decision maker, while in administrative hearings, there is
no guarantee that the opposing side will be given the opportunity
to contest either the evidence or the arguments.72
2. Inherent Bias
The Supreme Court also expressed concern over the rather sum-
mary administrative decision-making process, in particular, the fact
that administrative agencies often rendered decisions aimed princi-
pally at effectuating the agency's objectives.73 This difference be-
Deretich v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1153 (8th Cir. 1986) (preclud-
ing § 1983 claim even after determining that plaintiff had met the Utah Construction
test); Athan v. Prof'l Air Traffic Controllers Org., 672 F.2d 706, 711 (8th Cir. 1982)
(reversing trial court decision that allowed collateral estoppel as to an element of tort
not actually decided by administrative agency).
71. FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 532 (1965) (describing the
informal adjudication process of some state administrative agencies). Even those ju-
risdictions that provide published opinions often phrase the decision in purely statu-
tory language, without crucial details such as the findings of fact or rationale behind
the decision. Id. (providing examples of potential problems created by agency infor-
mality). Such ephemeral rulings tend to encourage rather than discourage deviations
from previous decisions, compounding the already difficult task of predicting hearing
outcomes. Hart, supra note 5, at 617 (demonstrating the attorney's inability to effec-
tively counsel clients in the absence of reliable administrative precedent). The lack of
some states' published (or otherwise illustrative) decisions impacts claim strategy, es-
pecially in the rare instance where an administrative hearing is not a prerequisite to a
court claim. Id. (implying that without a "solid basis" for advising one's client, it is
impossible to make an informed choice between an administrative and a judicial
claim); JOWELL, supra note 34, at 29 (criticizing administrative adjudicatory protocol
because of many decisions' unavailability to the public, in addition to the process
making it difficult for even attorneys to discern the rationale behind certain deci-
sions). But see, Friendly, supra note 44, at 1291 (bemoaning the American "ad-
dict[ion] to transcripts"); BERNARD K. SCHWARTZ ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF
GOVERNMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 132(1972) (labeling the United States' requirement that almost every proceeding result in
some manner of formal record as "unfavourably" impressing foreigners). In England,
for example, judicial review is conducted based on the recollection and notes of the
hearing officer, rather than a formal transcript. Friendly, supra note 44, at 1291-92
(acknowledging that America's lack of confidence in its administrative law judges pre-
vents a simpler approach to transcription).
72. Friendly, supra note 44, at 1277 (contrasting the formality between adminis-
trative and judicial adjudications).
73. Randy J. Hart, Note, Administrative Res Judicata in Ohio: A Suggestion For
the Future, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 595, 605 (1989)(acknowledging Supreme Court's fear
of institutional bias regarding administrative proceedings). See also Kremer v. Chem.
Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461, 498 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (relating Congress's
fear that state administrative agency procedures would ultimately prove inadequate
and less effective than those enforcement methods used by federal judiciary).
tween the administrative and adversarial systems underscores the
most compelling reason for not applying administrative claim pre-
clusion: the lack of political independence.74 A neutral judge or
jury provides the optimal potential to uncover the truth and to as-
sess fair and adequate remedies to the appropriate parties.7 5
Judges are (theoretically) free from political pressures, especially
federal judges who are lifetime appointees.76 This is, however, not
the case with administrative law judges, whose very employment
depends upon achieving the agency's goals and objectives. In
many cases, administrative plaintiffs are not represented by coun-
sel, increasing the likelihood that the inherent institutional bias will
make its way into the administrative law judge's decision.77
3. Interstate Disparity
In addition to the differences between courts and administrative
tribunals, administrative adjudications differ widely from one juris-
74. Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L.
REv. 329, 345-56 (1991) (exposing as the fundamental difference between agencies
and Article III courts the ties all agency adjudications have to the agency's enforce-
ment and rulemaking role).
75. Friendly, supra note 44, at 1279 (requiring an "unbiased tribunal" in all adju-
dicatory proceedings). "[T]he further the tribunal is removed from the agency and
thus from any suspicion of bias, the less may be the need for other procedural safe-
guards .... " Id. at 1279 (articulating the necessary elements of a fair hearing).
76. Id. (observing that "while all judges must be unbiased, some may be, or ap-
pear to be, more unbiased than others"). Friendly suggests that less stringent proce-
dural safeguards would be required if the administrative law judge were "not a
member of the agency." Id. This view is reflected in the increase of centralized ad-
ministrative hearings offices. Cf Bruff, supra note 74, at 345 (arguing that "even for-
mally separate institutions can come to share values, if the informal links between
them are strong enough"). Specialized adjudication agencies, like the centralized
Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings, become vulnerable, according to
Bruff, "due to the effects of a steady diet of subject matter and repeated advocacy
from a single source." Id. (remarking that administrative law judges are often "in, but
not of, the agenc[y]," with the agency retaining a "legitimate interest" in the adminis-
trative law judge's determinations).
77. Silver, supra note 4, at 376 (claiming that many civil rights litigants cannot
afford counsel for the administrative proceedings). But see Friendly, supra note 44, at
1288 (arguing against the participation of counsel in administrative proceedings). De-
spite the obvious advantages counsel may offer to parties, there is the high probability
that counsel may advance his client's interest using the tools of delay and confusion.
Id. (considering the impact of counsel's most zealous advocacy on the proceedings
themselves). In addition, if counsel appears for the claimant, the government will
likely follow suit, providing counsel at the expense of the public treasury and likely
complicating and protracting the proceeding. Id. (stressing that potentially "amica-
ble" proceedings can become decidedly adversarial with the introduction of counsel
into the administrative equation).
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diction to the next in terms of procedure and formality.78 Some
states, for example, defer discrimination complaints to their own
agencies, while other states allow immediate federal EEOC in-
volvement.7 9 Circuit Judge Cudahy warned of the risk of inequity
posed by federal application of administrative claim preclusion in
Duggan v. Board of Education.8" Judge Cudahy recognized the
disparity between the two systems, comparing plaintiffs in non-
deferral states, who enjoy a de novo review at the federal level, to
plaintiffs in deferral states, who forfeit a federal trial de novo if the
responsible state agency rendered its findings of fact within sixty
days.8 '
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
PRECLUSION: UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE V. ELLIOTT
The Utah Construction paradigm 82 remained the test until the
Supreme Court expanded the scope of administrative preclusion in
University of Tennessee v. Elliott,83 which involved an agency deter-
mination regarding a racially motivated discharge. 84 Elliott con-
cerned a black employee's allegation of discrimination by the
University of Tennessee in violation of several civil rights statutes,
including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.85 The University of Tennessee held a hearing, where an
assistant to the Vice President of Elliott's department presided as
78. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM.
L.Rev. 1093, 1105 (1987) (noting that "the infrequency of Supreme Court review com-
bines with the formal independence of each circuit's law from that of other circuits to
permit a gradual balkanization of federal law"). Regardless of jurisdiction, however,
most administrative activities are rather informal and involve neither the Administra-
tive Procedure Act's rulemaking or adjudication provisions. ROBERT L. RABIN, PER-
SPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 265 (1975) (declaring that "[m]uch
regulatory activity takes place through inspections, investigations, negotiations and
other low visibility contacts between regulators and regulated parties ... ").
79. Duggan v. Rd. of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1295 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting the dif-
ferences between states that are able to defer claims to their own agencies and those
that must defer to the EEOC).
80. Id. at 1295 n.10 (counseling against administrative claim preclusion for unre-
viewed agency decisions in light of the disadvantage to residents of deferral states).
81. Id. at 1295 (comparing deferral and non-deferral states under the ADEA's
deferral mechanism).
82. See supra Part III.C.1.
83. 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
84. Id. at 790 (addressing the preclusive effect of an agency's determination that
the petitioner's discharge was not racially motivated).
85. Id.
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the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).8 6 After unsuccessfully ap-
pealing the ALJs ruling to the department's Vice President, Elliott
refused to seek review of the decision in state court, and turned
instead to federal court to pursue his civil rights claims.87 The Dis-
trict Court ruled that the civil rights statutes "were not intended to
afford the plaintiff a means of relitigating what [the] plaintiff has
heretofore litigated over a five-month period."88 However, the de-
cision was overturned on both the Title VII and the § 1983 claim by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,89 which
held that a denial of a trial de novo undermines the intent behind
both Title VII and § 1983. The Court further declared that "[a]t
least implicit in the legislative history ... is the recognition that
state determination of issues relevant to constitutional adjudication
is not an adequate substitute for full access to a federal court." 90
The Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court, unanimously holding
that res judicata did not operate to deny Elliott a trial de novo on
his Title VII claim.91
The Supreme Court disagreed, however, and while affirming the
Sixth Circuit's treatment of Elliott's Title VII claim,92 the Court
opted to exercise its federal common-law powers to give agency
fact finding the same res judicata effects in federal court as it would
86. Id. at 791.
87. Id. at 791-92. In addition to the conflict of interest concerns arising from the
Elliott facts, it should be noted that the ALJ expressly refused to consider the civil
rights claims (which were later pursued in federal court) and instead heard the re-
lated, but legally distinct, question of a racially motivated discharge. Elliott, 478 U.S.
at 791 (referring to the ALJ's admitted lack of jurisdiction over Elliott's federal civil
rights claims). Such a distinction could have arguably prevented (or at least signifi-
cantly complicated) application of administrative preclusion principles, because the
AL's admission explicitly negated the possibility of meeting the second prong of the
Utah Construction test. See also Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 422 (requiring issues to be
"properly before" the administrative body). Arguably, the Elliott Court disregarded
this detail for purposes of its decision, a decision that relied heavily upon Utah Con-
struction. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 797-99 (invoking the logic and wisdom of the Utah Con-
struction Court).
88. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 792 (quoting the District Court's reliance on common-law
preclusion principles to deny Elliott's claim).
89. Id. at 793-94 (reporting the circuit court's grant of a trial de novo on both
claims).
90. Elliott v. Univ. of Tenn., 766 F.2d 982, 992 (6th Cir. 1985) (refusing to fashion
a federal common-law rule of preclusion).
91. Id.
92. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 789, 799 (dissenting only as to the application of res judi-
cata to § 1983 actions, Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan, and Justice Blackmun each
concurred regarding Title VII's non-preclusive effects).
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receive in that state's courts.93 Such a rule, the Court claimed,
would serve as a "nationally unifying force." 94 While significantly
expanding administrative preclusion, the Elliott Court did not go as
far as to establish an absolute rule to govern administrative preclu-
sion.95 The Court chose instead to remand the issue back to lower
state and federal courts for further refinement. 96
A. Refinement in the Lower Courts
The refinement perpetrated by the lower courts resulted in the
inevitable split among the circuits.97 This means that despite the
issue preclusion guidelines articulated by the Elliott Court, the
lower circuit courts have refused to uniformly adopt the claim pre-
clusion tenets regarding unreviewed state administrative decisions
on federal claims arising from the same transaction. 98 Duggan v.
Board of Education99 and Stillians v. Iowa' exemplify the split
and are helpful in understanding the positions for each side.
93. Id. at 799 (justifying the Court's decision based on an absence of Congres-
sional intent to the contrary). Cf. Elliott, 487 U.S. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part) (criticizing the majority for neglecting to address or even consider the motiva-
tion for the early civil rights legislation that created § 1983 causes of action).
94. Elliott, 487 U.S. at 799 (quoting Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S.
261, 289 (1980)).
95. Id. (leaving open the question of the claim preclusive effects of unreviewed
administrative decisions).
96. Id. at 796-797, 799 (upholding the circuit court's grant of a federal trial de
novo to Title VII claims, but using policy reasons to supplant § 1983 Congressional
intent).
97. Compare Duggan v. Bd. of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1297 (7th Cir. 1987) (con-
cluding that the unreviewed factual agency determinations are not entitled to preclu-
sive effect in subsequent federal suits under the ADEA); with Stillians v. Iowa, 843
F.2d 276, 282 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding preclusion principles consistent with the statu-
tory framework and legislative purpose of the ADEA).
98. DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 1998) (declining to impose an
exhaustion requirement on § 1983 claims that would force claimants to bring all
claims before state administrative official or risk claim preclusion). See also G.V.V.
Rao v. County of Fairfax, 108 F.3d 42, 45-46 (4th Cir. 1997) (refusing to give preclu-
sive effect to unreviewed administrative Title VII decision); Delgado v. Lockheed-Ga.
Co., 815 F.2d 641, 646-47 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that because the state administra-
tive agency was not the proper forum to hear ADEA claims, claimant's failure to
litigate ADEA claim did not act to bar future federal causes of action). But see Miller
v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying federal com-
mon-law claim preclusion to § 1983 decisions).
99. 818 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1987).
100. 843 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1988).
1. Duggan v. Board of Education
Duggan involved a teacher's claim of age discrimination that was
dismissed by the hearing officer assigned to the case,' 01 and the
subsequent ADEA claim filed in federal court.10 2 The Seventh
Circuit in Duggan applied the Elliott Court's Title VII rubric to its
own examination of an ADEA claim, °3 and found that the statutes
should be construed alike.1°4 Acknowledging the lack of explicit
Congressional intent regarding preclusion in both Title VII and the
ADEA, the Duggan court relied on the Elliott Court's inferential
analysis of Title VII and drew parallels between Title VII and the
ADEA10 5 A thorough comparison of the two statutes' deferral
mechanisms, as well as the statutes' almost identical substantive
prohibitions, suggested similar treatment of Title VII and the
ADEA for preclusion purposes, prompting the Duggan court to
adopt the Elliott administrative res judicata prohibition of ADEA
claims.'0 6
2. Stillians v. Iowa
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit examined an almost identical situ-
ation in Stillians v. Iowa,10 7 and came to the opposite result reached
in Elliott and Duggan.1°8 The district court in Stillians found that
the legislative intent behind the ADEA regarding preclusion more
101. Duggan v. Bd. of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1292 (7th Cir. 1987). It is interesting
to note that among Duggan's complaints was the allegation that he was unable to
provide the necessary documentary evidence in support of his discrimination claim
because of the inadequate discovery measures allowed in the administrative proceed-
ing. Id. Under Illinois law, there was no method available for Duggan to compel
production of documentary evidence. ILL. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 122, § 24-12 (1985)
(outlining the extent to which an Illinois hearing officer may issue subpoenas and
other devices).
102. Duggan, 818 F.2d at 1292.
103. Id. at 1294 (examining Elliott and discussing the circuit split).
104. Id. at 1295 (examining the ADEA deferral mechanism as compared to Title
VII's deferral statute).
105. Id. at 1294-95 (following the Supreme Court's inferrential approach in its
own examination of the ADEA).
106. Duggan, 818 F.2d at 1295 (drawing on the Supreme Court's treatment of
Title VII claims after comparison with the ADEA). Cf. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 584 (1978) (finding that while Title VII and the ADEA share the same aims and
prohibitions, the statutes do not mirror each other regarding claimant's right to a jury
trial).
107. 843 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1988).
108. Id. at 276.
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closely resembled § 1983 than Title VII.1°9 The Eighth Circuit fo-
cused on the language of the ADEA to inform its decision to pre-
clude the federal discrimination claim. 110 Specifically, the Stillians
court declined to extend the Elliott treatment of Title VII to the
ADEA based solely on the similarity between select sections of the
statutes."' Expressly rejecting the Duggan approach of comparing
the statutes, the Stillians court refused to "reason by analogy when
interpreting statutes.""' 2 Instead, the court examined the ADEA
in isolation to determine the underlying Congressional intent."13
The Stillans court noted the absence of any language inconsistent
with preclusion, and found res judicata principles applicable." 4
V. THE NECESSITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY FINDINGS
One of the court's most important functions is to ensure that
administrative actions remain within their statutorily proscribed
109. Id. at 279-80 (relating the procedural history of the dispute before the
court).
110. Id. at 280 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Elliott, and conclud-
ing that the "most important lesson" to be learned was that in the absence of explicit
Congressional guidance, courts are charged with discerning the implicit legislative
intent).
111. Id. at 281-82. Remarkably, after the Stillians court criticized the Duggan
court for its interpretation of ADEA by language analogous to Title VII rather than
according to Congressional intent, the Eighth Circuit itself relied on statutory lan-
guage differences between the ADEA and Title VII to distinguish its holding from
Elliott. Id. (finding that a comparison of the statutes' language revealed dissimilari-
ties). Chief Justice Lay, in his Stillians dissent, points out the majority's inconsistent
logic, and notes the Elliott Court's comparison of Title VII and § 1983 was founded on
the same rationale. Id. at 283 n.1 (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing both the Elliott
and Stillians decisions for utilizing "an improper method of determining congressional
intent").
112. Id. at 281 (declining parallel treatment of ADEA and Title VII based upon
the parallels between the statutes).
113. Stillans, 843 F.2d at 281 (adopting the "proper analysis" for finding applica-
tion of preclusion principles).
114. Id. at 281-82 (finding "highly probative" the ADEA's lack of any language
inconsistent with administrative preclusion). But see id. at 281-82 (acknowledging the
court's disapproval of inferring Congressional intent based on the absence of a nega-
tive). Tvice the Stillians court referenced its objection and aversion to the method of
analysis it ultimately chose, yet remarkably the court was left with the "firm convic-
tion" that Congress did not intend preclusion principles to apply to the ADEA. Id. at
282 (weakening the court's own holding by relying on suspect logic). The court's find-
ing of preclusion applicability is hardly strengthened by statements such as "[wihether
this was by conscious design or by default is really not important" when referencing
Congressional intent. Id. at 282 (providing a less than compelling rationale for its
determination of Congressional intent).
boundaries. 115 The legitimacy of administrative decisions depends
in part on the agency's ability to receive judicial validation of its
rulings." 6  In this regard, Justice Blackmun once stated that
"[s]tate court review [of administrative decisions] is merely the last
step in the administrative process, the final means of review of the
state agency's decision.""' 7 Concerns over "cabining political dis-
cretion" are at the heart of judicial reviewing agency determina-
115. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON
REG. 283, 283 (1986) (discussing the judiciary function of ensuring that administrative
agencies stay within intended boundaries).
116. William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85
YALE L.J. 38, 38 (1975) (observing that judicial review provides the first hard look at
an administrative agency's analysis and conclusions); COOPER, supra note 5, at 305
(recognizing the four central functions of the courts in reviewing administrative deci-
sions: "1) checking excessive assumptions of power...; 2) speaking the final word on
important questions of statutory interpretation; 3) requiring fair procedure in admin-
istrative action; and 4) invalidating arbitrary or capricious administrative action");
EDLEY, supra note 3, at 236 (observing that judicial review serves the important func-
tion of reassuring an authoritative decision). The Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments details the requirements necessary before a court may apply administrative res
judicata. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 (1981) (providing both per-
suasive authority and helpful commentary regarding preclusion). The general rule
under the Restatement is that "a valid and final adjudicative determination by an
administrative tribunal" enjoys the same preclusive effect as a court judgment would
in subsequent litigation. Id. at § 83(1) (outlining the general rule and its effects).
There are three primary qualifications to the general rule, however. First, the admin-
istrative proceeding must contain the "essential elements of adjudication." Id. at
§ 83(2) (noting the first requirement for preclusion). These essential elements in-
clude: (1) adequate notice to any parties expected to be bound by the litigation, (2)
the opportunity to both present supporting evidence and rebut opposing evidence, (3)
a formulation of the specific issues of law and fact to be addressed by the administra-
tive tribunal, (4) a rule of finality, and (5) any additional procedural elements neces-
sary "to constitute the proceeding a sufficient means of conclusively determining the
matter in question ...." Id. (cataloging considerations for preclusion). Second, reliti-
gation of a claim is not barred under claim preclusion if the "scheme of remedies
permits assertion of the second claim notwithstanding the adjudication of the first
claim." Id. at § 83(3) (describing the problem as one of statutory interpretation).
Third, though by no means exhaustive, issue preclusion does not act as a bar to reliti-
gation provided that the disputed issue is allowed independent resolution by a subse-
quent tribunal. Id. at § 83(4) (explaining that if a trial de novo is held as to a certain
issue, there can be no preclusion).
117. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 490 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (articulating rationale for requiring judicial review of state administrative
agency adjudications). In his dissent, Justice Blackmun also addressed the importance
of the term "proceeding" when deciding the role of judicial review of administrative
adjudications. Id. at 494, n.10 (explaining that Congressional inclusion of judicial re-
view of an agency decision could rationally be found to exist under the heading "pro-
ceeding" without also having to include an entire state court trial on the merits within
the boundaries of a "proceeding").
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tions,118 with "direct discovery of an agency's motives" another
primary focus.1 9 The judicial superintending of administrative de-
cisions gave way to four primary categories of concern: "1) check-
ing excessive assumptions of power...; 2) speaking the final word
on important questions of statutory interpretation; 3) requiring fair
procedure in administrative action; and 4) invalidating arbitrary or
capricious administrative action. "120
Civil rights and other distinctly federal objectives are adjudi-
cated by administrative agencies as long as a provision is made for
judicial review.12' This rule received affirmation in Kremer v.
Chemical Construction Corporation.1 22 Kremer is a 1982 United
States Supreme Court decision holding that federal district courts
are required to give preclusive effect to a state court affirmance of
a state administrative agency's rejection of a Title VII discrimina-
tion claim. 123 In Kremer, the plaintiff, a Polish immigrant, was laid
off by Chemical Construction Corporation (Chemico) along with
several other Chemico employees. 24 Later many of these employ-
ees were rehired, but Chemico refused Kremer's repeated requests
to be rehired.1 2 5 Kremer thereafter filed a discrimination claim
with the EEOC alleging failure to rehire based on his Jewish faith
and national origin.126 After hearing his claim, the New York State
Division of Human Rights (NYHRD) concluded that there was no
118. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 63 (1985) (describing the reviewing courts' motivations when examining
agency rulings). "Reviewing courts are attempting to ensure that the agency has not
merely responded to political pressure but that it is instead deliberating in order to
identify and implement the public values that should control the controversy." Id.
(establishing a rationale for judicial review); see also EDLEY, supra note 3, at 193
(summarizing case law motivations behind "hard-look" judicial review).
119. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV.
505, 554 (1985) (identifying agency fidelity to statutory purpose as a necessary strat-
egy for reviewing courts).
120. Id. at 553-55 (reviewing main objectives of judicial review).
121. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 115 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the importance of judicial safeguards to other-
wise unchecked administrative adjudicatory powers); BERNARD K. SCHWARTZ, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW 11 (3d ed. 1991) (describing judicial review as "the ultimate
constitutional safeguard").
122. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
123. Id. at 485 (relying on the absence of an "'affirmative showing' of a 'clear
and manifest' legislative purpose in Title VII to deny res judicata or collateral estop-
pel effect to a state court judgment").
124. Id. at 463 (prefacing the Court's opinion with the facts of the case).
125. Id.
126. Id. (describing the events leading up to the Title VII litigation).
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evidence to support a charge of discrimination. 127 Consequently,
Kremer sought judicial review with the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court, which unanimously affirmed the
NYHRD ruling.1
28
The Kremer Court observed that nowhere in Title VII is the
claimant required to pursue an unfavorable state administrative
decision in state court,'129 but once a plaintiff does seek the finality
found in judicial review, claim preclusion is absolutely appropriate
under federal common-law preclusion doctrine. 3 ° It is important
to note that Kremer involved an administrative determination that
was subjected to judicial review, therefore enjoying enhanced due
process protection, making application of claim preclusion more
appropriate. 31
Christopher Edley, a professor at Harvard Law School, ad-
dressed the legitimacy that multiple forums can provide agency de-
terminations. 32  The necessity of constitutional checks and
balances on the inherently executive administrative process re-
quires a multiplicity of forums to ensure that one branch does not
become overburdened and consequently incapable of properly and
effectively governing. 133 Edley points to the legislative response of
delegating responsibility to administrative agencies to aid in the
otherwise legislative task of policy-making as an example of this
need for multiple forums.13 4
127. Id. at 464.
128. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 464 (relating the procedural history of Kremer).
129. Id. at 469 (discussing the permissiveness of judicial review for unfavorable
state administrative agency decisions under Title VII).
130. Id. at 470-71 (relying on both the language of Title VII and prior court deci-
sions to refuse redetermination of a final judgment).
131. Id. at 484 (concluding that the state's extensive procedural requirements,
ending in judicial review, provide sufficient due process protection).
132. EDLEY, supra note 3, at 236-37 (lauding the incorporation of separation of
powers doctrine into the system of judicial review of administrative determinations).
See also Bruff, supra note 8, at 332 (reporting that institutional separation effects the
quality of the agency decision).
133. EDLEY, supra note 3, at 236 (opining that the explosion of demands upon
each branch of government requires stricter adherence to separation of powers princi-
ples); see also Bruff, supra note 8, at 346-47 (echoing the need for an independent
adjudicator).
134. EDLEY, supra note 3, at 236-37 (butressing his multiple forum argument
with examples of inter-branch delegation). See also Bruff, supra note 8, at 346-47
(relying on institutional independence as a tool to ensure an unbiased decision).
Fail 2000
226 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 20-2
VI. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF CIVIL RIGHTS
Rights created and designed primarily to protect individuals
from attacks on their freedom by other persons are called civil
rights.'35 The first civil rights legislation was proposed by President
John F. Kennedy, and called for enforcement through federal court
suits.' 3 6 Though lacking crucial bipartisan support, and countered
by Senate Bill 1937, introduced by Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-
Minn.), 137 Kennedy's vision eventually culminated into the estab-
lishment of the EEOC. 38 As conceived by the drafters of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, all civil rights enforcement power was reserved
to the federal courts with express refusal of such jurisdiction to the
administrative agency, the EEOC.139
135. EDWIN S. NEWMAN, THE LAW OF CIVIL RIGWrS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 73
(1949), reprinted in EDWIN S. NEWMAN, THE FREEDOM READER 167 (1963) (defining
civil rights as united by common purpose and goals).
136. H.R. 405, 88th Cong. (1964). See also BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL ON FAIR
EMPLOYMENT PRACrICES, PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND FEDERAL ASSISTANCE,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964: TEXT, ANALYSIS, AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 20
(1964) [hereinafter BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL] (calling for civil rights enforcement
using the federal judiciary).
137. BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 136, at 21 (describing opposition to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
138. Karen L. Ross, Note, Combatting Racism: Would Repealing Title VII Bring
Equality To All?, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 141, 151-52 (1997) (outlining the historical
evolution of civil rights legislation in the United States).
139. BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 136, at 21 (awarding enforcement
power not to the EEOC, but instead to federal district courts). See also Kremer v.
Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 469 (1982) (remarking that "the federal courts
were entrusted with ultimate enforcement responsibility [of Title VII]"); Kremer, 456
U.S. at 494-95 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (recognizing the repeated refusals by Con-
gress to award state agencies exclusive jurisdiction over allegations of discrimination);
Mark T. Conlon, Comment, Employment Law - Arbitration Not A Prerequisite To
Federal Court Proceeding On A Title VII Claim, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 271, 277
(1990) (emphasizing that Congress intended the judiciary to "exercise final responsi-
bility for the enforcement of Title VII"); Clifford R. Perry, III, Note, State Adminis-
trative Preclusion in ADEA Federal Court Suits-Answering Elliot's Call, 67 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1131, 1134 (1989) (stating that "Congress vested federal courts with the final
responsibility for enforcement of Title VII claims"); 110 CONG. REC. S13693-95 (daily
ed. June 13, 1964) (detailing the debates surrounding the enforcement of Title VII).
But see 105 CONG. REC. S6449 (daily ed. April 22, 1964) (reporting comments of Sen-
ator Dirksen, one of the primary drafters of the Senate version of the Civil Rights
Act). Senator Dirksen remarked:
What a layering upon layer of enforcement. What if the court orders differed
in their terms or requirements? There would be no assurance that they
would be identical. Should we have the Federal forces of justice pull on the
one arm, and the State forces of justice tug on the other. Should we draw
and quarter the victim?
Id. (arguing against multiple forum enforcement for civil rights).
A. Protection of Civil Rights Through Federal Courts
As originally conceived by the 1964 Congress responsible for
passing the original Civil Rights Act, federal courts were consid-
ered obligated to ensure that civil rights were fully protected.
140
The United States Supreme Court recognized the limited jurisdic-
tion state agencies have over grievances based on civil rights viola-
tions. 141 The full extent of the federal judiciary's responsibility can
be seen in Senator Hubert Humphrey's remarks to the United
States Senate:
[W]e recognized the absolute necessity of providing
the Federal Government with authority to act in in-
stances where States and localities did not choose to
exercise these opportunities to solve the problem of
civil rights in a voluntary and localized manner. The
basic rights protected by [Title VII] are rights which
accrue to citizens of the United States; the Federal
Government has the clear obligation to see that
these rights are fully protected.
142
140. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 761-62 n.8. (1979) (quoting 110
CONG. REc. S12725 (daily ed. June 15, 1964)). See also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 115 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (urging judi-
cial review of administrative adjudications); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456
U.S. 461, 498 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (relating that throughout Title VII's legisla-
tive evolution, Congress feared that state administrative agency procedures would ul-
timately prove inadequate and less effective than those enforcement methods the
Congress envisioned being used by federal actors). The entire process of retroactive
legislative intent interpretation is suspect at best, however, proving a fertile area for
scholarly debate. Compare Kremer, 456 U.S. at 472, n.9 (lamenting the scarcity of
available legislative records to aid in Congressional interpretation efforts), with
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 498, n.12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (lauding the Clark-Case
memorandum as being especially instructive in determining Title VII legislative
intent).
141. Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 761 (interpreting portions of the ADEA to only
slightly extend state agency opportunity at settling grievances in a "voluntary and
localized manner"); cf. Silver, supra note 4, at 375 (listing agencies that, while not able
to hear civil rights claims are allowed to make determinations related to and having
impact on civil rights claims).
142. 110 CONG. REC. S12725 (daily ed. June 15, 1964) (quoting Senator
Humphrey during legislative debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Additionally,
the Supreme Court noted in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. that "the resolution of
statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial con-
struction has proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad lan-
guage frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts."
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (defining the motivation
behind judicial review of agency civil rights determinations).
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It is important to note, however, that the absence or unavailability
of state remedies does not foreclose federal relief.143
B. Other Aspects Bolstering the Continued Presence of
Civil Rights
The underlying reasons for the passage of civil rights legislation
are far more complex than the often morality-tinged racial equality
concerns normally proffered as justification.'4 Though tradition-
ally referred to within a moral context,'145 scholars are not con-
vinced that morality alone would have compelled Congress to
enact civil rights legislation. 46 Economic pressures factored heav-
ily into the decision, 47 as did Congressional worries regarding the
143. Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 761 (rejecting the notion that Congress intended
absence of state relief to also foreclose federal relief of civil rights claims); Voutsis v.
Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 893 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that § 1983 "enforce-
ment scheme contemplates a resort to the federal remedy if the state machinery has
proved inadequate").
144. BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 25 (1997) (listing community, commerce, moral-
ity, order, history, and structure as the motivations behind civil rights legislation);
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER
SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 117 (1965) (listing several detri-
mental national economic effects of employment discrimination) reprinted in EEOC,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT, at 29
(1981).
145. Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights, 63
PUB. PAPERS 469 (1964) (declaring "[w]e are confronted primarily with a moral issue
... as old as the scriptures and ... as clear as the American Constitution"); Deval
Patrick, Reclaiming America's Conscience, Legal Times, April 23, 1994, at 16 (refer-
ring to civil rights as the "great moral imperative").
146. BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 27 (1997) (asking whether moral concerns were
the only motivation behind civil rights legislation). Accord Exec. Order No. 10,974, 3
C.F.R. 412 (1961-1965) (establishing the President's Committee on Civil Rights under
President 'fTruman). "The preservation of civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution is
essential to domestic tranquility, national security, the general welfare, and the con-
tinued existence of our free institutions." Id. (proclaiming the importance of protect-
ing civil rights). Four central types of individual rights were recognized by the
President's Committee on Civil Rights: 1) the "right to safety and security of the per-
son," 2) the "right to citizenship and its privileges," 3) the "right to freedom of con-
science and expression," and 4) the "right to equality of opportunity." To SECURE
THESE RIGHTS, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 4-9(1947) (valuing four types of individual liberties over all others) reprinted in EDWIN S.
NEWMAN, THE FREEDOM READER 169-72 (2d ed. 1963). The government's commit-
ment to "equality of opportunity" is reflected in each of the federal statutes at issue;
§ 1983, Title VII, and the ADEA.
147. BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 27 (1997) (reporting that when civil rights legisla-
tion was passed, racial discrimination was believed to exclude up to ten percent of the
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continued unrest in the Southern states.148 Many of these same
concerns are reasonably at the heart of enforcing individual civil
rights. 149 Given the substantial portion of the population that is
either a racial minority or female (coupled with the potential to fall
into more than one of these categories), it is arguable that the po-
litical and economic motivations may be even stronger today than
in 1964, in spite of an arguably weaker moral motivation. 5 °
C. Weakening of Civil Rights
With the passage of time and changes in the country's political
make-up, attempts at weakening the importance and the protection
of individual civil rights are increasingly frequent. 151 In spite of ar-
nation's population from jobs and the marketplace); accord BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
1977 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 25 (1977) (showing that the
American population in 1960 was ten percent black).
148. Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Su-
preme Court, 1936-1961, 247-56 (1994) (describing the country's staunch resistance to
desegregation efforts); COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNITED STATES COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, at 65-77 (1961) (acknowledging state legislative attempts
at circumventing constitutional and federal desegregation laws aimed at
desegregation).
149. It is a useful comparison to note that while conducting the Secretary of La-
bor Report commissioned by Title VII, the Secretary found that arbitrary age discrim-
ination was detrimental to the nation's economy in that it robbed the nation of
productive workers and contributed to increased payment of unemployment and so-
cial security benefits. U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Older American Worker, Age Dis-
crimination in Employment, Report of the Secretary of Labor to the Congress Under
Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1965), reprinted in EEOC, Legislative
History of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1981) (reporting the findings
of the Title VII-mandated investigation into age discrimination). The Secretary also
found older workers often suffered from serious economic and psychological impair-
ment as a result of age discrimination. Id. at 18 (advancing several negative effects of
age discrimination on the American public).
150. EDWIN S. NEWMAN, THE FREEDOM READER 186 (2d ed. 1963) (asking
whether each citizen is "economically, socially, politically-and psychologically-a
first-class citizen, fully integrated in American society"). See also, To SECURE THESE
RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, at 133-35 (de-
claring that "[t]he achievement of full civil rights in law may do as much to end
prejudice as the end of prejudice may do to achieve full civil rights ... The fewer the
opportunities there are to use inequality in the law as a reinforcement of prejudice,
the sooner prejudice will vanish"), reprinted in EDWIN S. NEWMAN, THE FREEDOM
READER 208 (2d ed. 1963).
151. The recent Reagan and Bush administrations exhibited an almost openly
hostile attitude towards civil rights. Karen L. Ross, Note, Combating Racism: Would
Repealing Title VII Bring Equality To All?, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 141, 148-49
(1997) (criticizing both administrations' historical veto's on civil rights legislation, and
each's reluctance to appoint minorities to important government positions); BRIAN K.
LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE 20 (1997) (reporting the Reagan-Bush era's staunch opposition to
enforcing affirmative action); JACK GREENBURG, CRUSADES IN THE COURTS 380
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guable hostility toward and weakening of the federal government's
commitment to protecting individual civil rights, Congress recently
passed significant legislation aimed at expanding civil rights protec-
tions.152 It is therefore important to recognize that for purposes of
statutory construction, legislative observations and opinions made
years after enactment of civil rights legislation are in no way a part
of the legislative history. 153 The controlling intent is that of the
enacting Congress alone.
VII. ADMINISTRATIVE PRECLUSION AND CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION
The Supreme Court has gradually elaborated on its vision of ad-
ministrative preclusion, but its efforts at clarification have only suc-
ceeded in further muddling the problem. Utah Construction left
circuit courts with three necessary factors for applying claim pre-
clusion to administrative decisions: 1) was the agency acting in a
judicial capacity; 2) did the agency resolve issues of fact properly
before it; and 3) did the parties have an adequate opportunity to
litigate? 154
Concerns about overstepping separation of powers boundaries
by creating federal common law prompted the Supreme Court to
re-examine the issue in light of statutory language and Congres-
sional intent much later in the University of Tennessee v. Elliott de-
cision.155 The Elliott Court faced the issue of whether a state
administrative law judge's decision that Elliott was not discharged
because of racially motivated prejudice precluded subsequent fed-
(1994) (reporting Reagan's and Bush's limited appointment of women and minorities
to the bench).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-74 (1988) (amending and improving the Voting Rights
Act of 1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3616 (1988) (expanding the Fair Housing Act); 20
U.S.C. §§ 706, 794 (1987) (overriding Reagan's presidential veto to pass the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987).
153. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979) (refusing to consider
a Senate Report written eleven years after passage of the ADEA); Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977) (recognizing that the intent
of the Congress that enacted the statutory section controls judicial interpretation);
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 n.7 (1977) (rejecting inclusion of
legislative observations into legislative history).
154. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966)
(proffering a list of preclusion requirements).
155. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 795-98 (1986) (using legislative his-
tory and previous Supreme Court holdings to determine the preclusive effects of Title
VII and § 1983 claims).
eral claims of civil rights violations. 156 Initially, the district court
ruled that the civil rights statutes were not designed to allow plain-
tiffs to relitigate an already decided matter.157 The Supreme Court,
however, overturned the Court of Appeal's reversal by utilizing its
rule of preclusion as it pertains to an administrative agency's find-
ings of fact in § 1983 actions.158 The Elliott Court declared that in
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it would fashion a
common-law rule of preclusion.
59
A. Treating Title VII and ADEA Claims Alike
1. Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Solomino:
Treatment of Title VII and ADEA
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of admin-
istrative preclusion in the context of age discrimination in Astoria
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Solimino,'160 a 1991 decision
holding that the judicially unreviewed findings of a state adminis-
trative agency had no preclusive effect on federal proceedings.
161
In Astoria, Solimino filed a charge with the EEOC claiming a
violation of the ADEA.162 The state agency responsible for han-
dling the claim found no probable cause to support allegations of
age discrimination and dismissed the claim. 163 Rather than pursue
the claim in state court, Solimino filed an age discrimination claim
in federal district court grounded on the same factual basis. 164 Jus-
tice Souter, in delivering the opinion of the Court, addressed the
Court's preference for application of the common-law doctrine of
preclusion to final administrative claims. 65 Invoking the standards
156. Id. at 790.
157. Id. at 792.
158. Id. at 797-99 (providing both historical and practical reasons for applying
claim preclusion principles to § 1983 administrative fact finding).
159. Id. at 799 (justifying the Court's decision based on an absence of Congres-
sional intent to the contrary). Cf. id.. at 799-800 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (criti-
cizing the majority for neglecting to address or even consider the motivation for the
early civil rights legislation that created § 1983 causes of action).
160. 501 U.S. 104 (1991).
161. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110 (1991) (de-
claring that federal courts face no preclusion from state administrative agency find-
ings regarding age discrimination claims).
162. Astoria, 501 U.S. at 106.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 106-07.
165. Id. at 107 (stating that "[w]e have long favored application of the common-
law doctrines of collateral estoppel... and res judicata ... to those determinations of
administrative bodies that have attained finality").
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outlined in Utah Construction, Justice Souter emphasized the un-
fairness that would result were an applicant allowed a "rematch
after a defeat fairly suffered.' '1 66
Rather than continue to evaluate Solimino's claim according to
preclusion principles, the Court switched gears to instead focus on
Congressional intent. 67 Noting that the Court presumes Congress
to operate "against a background of common-law adjudicatory
principles' 1 68 such as preclusion, Justice Souter observed that in
spite of the rule of preclusionary preference, certain circumstances
render preclusion unsuitable. 69 Among the things that can advise
against the suitability of preclusion are the "specific context of the
rights at stake" and the "relative adequacy of agency proce-
dures. ' 7 ° In addition, it bears noting that Justice Souter made
multiple statements distinguishing judicially unreviewed state ad-
ministrative agency decisions from those that previously faced judi-
cial scrutiny.' 7'
2. Implications of Astoria for the Proposition that
Administrative Decisions Touching on Civil Rights
Issues Should Be Reviewable
Echoed in Astoria was the understanding that the Congressional
intent behind the passage of Title VII was to promote equality in
the American workplace by prohibiting discriminatory employ-
ment practices based upon one's "race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.' 72 Congress likewise passed the Age Discrimination
166. Id. at 107 (quoting the repose enforcement paradigm laid out in United
States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)).
167. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (ques-
tioning legislative intent before applying administrative preclusion to Solimino's
claim).
168. Id. at 108 (articulating legislative interpretation standards and assumptions).
169. Id. at 109-10 (listing the considerations that must be addressed before apply-
ing claim preclusion).
170. Id. at 110 (refusing to blindly apply preclusionary principles).
171. Id. at 107, 113 (stressing that the Astoria holding pertains to only those ad-
ministrative adjudications that have not been appealed to a state district court,
thereby achieving finality).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (outlining provisions of Title VII); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (observing "that in enacting Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit all practices in
whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin"); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (stating that Congress enacted Title VII to ensure
employment opportunity equality); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
800 (1973) (declaring Congressional intent behind Title VII was to end employment
in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967171 to combat the growing
problem of age discrimination in the American workplace.174 The
two acts are traditionally interpreted through references to one an-
other, with the ADEA uniformly considered prompted by and pat-
terned after Title VII. 7
5
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, or sex); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (announcing that the equality objective
of Title VII is "plain from the language of the statute"); Monica L. Goodman, Com-
ment, Title VII and the Federal Arbitration Act, 33 TULSA L.J. 665, 674-75 (1997) (la-
beling Title VII's legislative intent to eradicate discrimination facially evident).
Section 2000e-2 of Title VII provides:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges, of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (prohibiting discriminatory employment practices).
173. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1994)) (prohibiting age discrimination).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994) (prohibiting discriminatory employment practices
based on age). Section 623 of the ADEA states in part: "It shall be unlawful for an
employer ... to fail to hire or to discharge any individual.., because of such individ-
ual's age .... " 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994) (outlawing age-based employment dis-
crimination). As a compromise for those legislators who wanted to include "age"
within Title VII's protected classes, the original enactment of Title VII ordered the
Secretary of Labor to study the effect of age discrimination in America, the resulting
report ultimately becoming the blueprint for the ADEA. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715,
78 Stat. 265 (1964) (repealed 1966) (requiring the Secretary of Labor to investigate
age-based discrimination); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or
Impact, in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE AND LITI-
GATION MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68, 83 (1982) (con-
cluding that the Secretary's Report was "the basic document shaping the thinking of
Congress which led to the Age Discrimination Act"); JOSEPH E. KALET, AGE Dis-
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 2 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the Secretary's report
and concluding that "[t]he Report led directly to the enactment of the ADEA"). See
also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 230-31 (1983) (noting in its discussion of the
ADEA's legislative history that recommendations contained in the Secretary's report
were accepted by both the executive and legislative branches).
175. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 n.12 (1978) (observing that substantial
portions of the ADEA "were derived in haec verba from Title VII"). "In haec verba"
means "in the same words." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 782 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
"in haec verba"). Comparisons between the actual language of the statutes reveals
their almost identical drafting. Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d
818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972) (observing that prohibitions contained in the ADEA are al-
most identical to those of Title VII). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) [Title
VII provision] which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
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Many commentators argued that the ADEA and Title VII
should be treated differently because the ADEA was enacted as an
independent statutory scheme rather than as an amendment to the
existing Title VII.176 This argument ignores the political realities of
lawmaking entirely, and instead only heaps more legal fiction atop
the growing pile of illusory tricks used by the judiciary to aid in
statutory interpretation. It hardly stretches the imagination to en-
vision a group of modern lawmakers vehemently rejecting any sug-
gestions toward an efficient amendment approach to ending age
discrimination in favor of a bolder, catchier, easier-on-the-voters-
ears independent Congressional act. This rationale no doubt rings
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely effect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination), with 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) [ADEA provision] which states:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's age.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (1994) (prohibiting age-related discrimination). The paral-
lels between the two statutes support the argument against application of claim pre-
clusion to state administrative decisions, but one must resist the urge to treat the
ADEA and Title VII identically in all instances. An example of an ill-suited parallel
between the two can be seen in the debate over application of disparate impact liabil-
ity to the ADEA in light of the recent disparate impact amendment to Title VII.
Compare Brendan Sweeney, Comment, "Downsizing" the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act: The Availability of Disparate Impact Liability, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1527,
1574-75 (1996) (urging that the extension of disparate impact doctrine to the ADEA
is logical when the statute's similarities to Title VII are revealed); with Evan H. Pontz,
Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact Theory Should
Not Apply To the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 267, 310-11
(1995) (arguing against extension of disparate impact theory to ADEA claims due to
the constitutional equal protection distinctions made between the classes each statute
protects).
176. CHARLES MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 640 (2d ed. 1983) (noting
Congress's refusal to amend Title VII to include ADEA provisions); Clifford R.
Perry, III, Note, State Administrative Preclusion in ADEA Federal Court Suits-An-
swering Elliott's Call, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 1131, 1131 (citing 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984)
(noting Congress's refusal to amend Title VII to include the ADEA provisions)).
truer for many of those more jaded legal scholars than the feeble
circumstantial factors used by the Court.
3. Continued Implications and Reasons to Treat Title VII and
ADEA Equally
In addition to Congressional intent, a thorough comparison of
Title VII's deferral mechanisms with those of the ADEA urges
identical construction of the two statutes with respect to adminis-
trative claim preclusion. 177 Deferral mechanisms allow state agen-
cies a limited opportunity under state law to address allegations of
discrimination.178 Deferral mechanisms further operate to define
the statute's relationship to the federal courts, state agencies, and
the EEOC,179 and are often seen as the primary indicator of Con-
gressional intent regarding the availability of forums for claims
arising under a particular statute. 8° For example, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Duggan, found that the ADEA's deferral mechanism is de-
rived from that of Title VII.' 8 ' Both statutes allow employment
discrimination claims to be heard in multiple forums, suggesting
that the adjudicatory process was not meant to end at the less for-
mal administrative stage, without any opportunity for a judicial
remedy. 182 Judge Cudahy, of the Seventh Circuit wrote: "Congress
obviously intended that persons with discrimination claims first
submit them to state and federal agencies in the hope that the com-
plaint could be resolved through administrative means before turn-
ing to the courts.' '1 83
177. Duggan v. Bd. of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1295 (7th Cir. 1987) (refusing to
infer Congressional intention to end discrimination enforcement measures at the ad-
ministrative level).
178. Id. (explaining the purpose of a deferral mechanism).
179. Id. (articulating the effects of a deferral mechanism).
180. Id. (explaining that "[d]eferral mechanisms effectively define the relation-
ship between state agencies, the EEOC, and the federal judiciary.").
181. Id. (comparing the state agency opportunity to resolve discrimination claims
between the ADEA and Title VII). See also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S.
750, 755 (1979) (acknowledging the similarities between the ADEA and its predeces-
sor, Title VII, and finding that ADEA was based in large part on Title VII).
182. Duggan, 818 F.2d at 1295 (interpreting the multiple forum deferral mecha-
nisms to extend discrimination adjudication beyond the administrative level). Cf.
Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 478 (1982) (denying a federal trial de
novo for Title VII claims already granted a state district court judgment).
183. Duggan, 818 F.2d at 1295 (citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750,
755 (1979)). Judge Cudahy went on to say, "[I]t is unlikely that Congress intended the
process to effectively stop at the state agency level before any court has had the op-
portunity to consider the discrimination claim." Id.
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B. Providing § 1983 Claims De Novo Review
While the legislation creating § 1983 actions has an earlier gene-
sis from both Title VII and the ADEA, the underlying impetus for
the statute is very much in keeping with the rationale behind each
of the later statutes."8 In Monroe v. Pape,'85 the United States
Supreme Court gave substantial treatment to the historical and leg-
islative events leading up to the enactment of § 1983.186 The most
remarkable similarity between § 1983, Title VII, and the ADEA is
that each is a concerted effort to remedy civil rights violations. 187
Another important parallel, especially in terms of the advisability
of administrative claim preclusion, is the provision for multiple fo-
rums in each statute. 188 The Monroe Court also found as a facially
apparent motive for enactment of § 1983 the desire to provide a
"federal right in federal courts."' 8 9
184. Compare Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (concluding that Con-
gress in enacting § 1983 meant to provide a remedy for persons deprived of constitu-
tional rights, privileges and immunities), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1994)
(declaring the purpose of Title VII, in part, is "to authorize ... suits to protect consti-
tutional rights"), and 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994) (protecting persons over forty years old
from disparate treatment). Section 1983 reads, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1967) (prohibiting civil rights violations).
185. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
186. Id. at 177-78 (quoting various lawmakers' testimony regarding the lack of
state enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment's provisions). Section 1983 was
originally § 1 of the Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871. Id. at 171 (relating the historical
underpinnings of § 1983). Section 1983 was the Congressional response to the contin-
ued constitutional violations committed by state and local authorities. Id. at 174 (cat-
egorizing § 1983 as an enforcement mechanism to ensure civil rights protection).
187. Id. at 180 (concluding that Congress in enacting § 1983 meant to provide a
remedy for persons "deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities"); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1994) (declaring the purpose, in part, of Title VII "to author-
ize ... suits to protect constitutional rights"); 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994) (protecting per-
sons from disparate treatment).
188. Duggan v. Bd. of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1294 (1987) (noting that "both [Title
VII and ADEA] provide for parallel or overlapping administrative and judicial reme-
dies, and both ultimately favor judicial resolution of disputed factual issues.").
189. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180 (recognizing as "abundantly clear" the legislative
desire to provide alternative federal jurisdiction in light of the "prejudice, passion,
neglect [and] intolerance" regarding enforcement at the state level).
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In University of Tennessee v. Elliott,190 the Court relied heavily
on the decision in United States v. Utah Construction Co.191 to for-
mulate its rules of preclusion. 92 There is a strong argument that
the Elliott Court should have relied on McDonald v. City of West
Branch'93 rather than Utah Construction.94 The Supreme Court's
holding in McDonald, that an arbitration of a § 1983 claim did not
preclude a subsequent federal suit, was a recognition that the arbi-
tration was not an "adequate substitute" for a judicial proceed-
ing.' 95 Such an assertion echoes the notion that preclusion cannot
(or at least, should not) occur when there is a marked disparity
between the two possible forums. The McDonald decision and the
commentator's argument both implicitly recognize the likelihood
that a state administrative agency determination will lack the pro-
cedural safeguards of its federal judicial counterpart. 196
VIII. CONCLUSION
The common thread running through all civil rights legislation is
the preservation and protection of individual Constitutional guar-
antees. 97 Though at first glance a potentially simplistic observa-
190. 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
191. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
192. Elliontt, 478 U.S. at 797 (recognizing the soundness of the principles ad-
vanced in Utah Construction).
193. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
194. Morris, supra note 23, at 208 (offering McDonald as a preferable basis for
preclusion due to McDonald's requirement that a state administrative hearing serve
as an adequate substitute for a federal proceeding before denying subsequent claim).
In McDonald, the Court addressed the advisability of giving preclusive effect to a
judicially unreviewed § 1983 decision of an arbitrator. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292
(refusing to fashion a federal common-law rule of preclusion for arbitration determi-
nations). Had Elliott undergirded its analysis with the logic of McDonald, the result-
ing rubric for determining whether to apply preclusion principles to unreviewed state
administrative agency decisions would have required examination of both administra-
tive procedural deficiencies and the expertise of the state agency in the disputed area.
Morris, supra note 23, at 250 (predicting what use of McDonald would have meant to
the Elliott decision).
195. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290-91 (stressing the lack of expertise arbitrators
possess regarding complex § 1983 legal questions).
196. Accord McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1984) (refus-
ing to grant preclusive effect to arbitration decision due to the severely limited proce-
dural protections); Morris, supra note 23, at 205 (suggesting that had Elliott followed
the McDonald analysis, federal courts would be required to first examine the adjudi-
catory procedure used).
197. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982) (declaring that
Title VII was enacted to assure equal protection concerning employment opportuni-
ties); Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 756 (emphasizing the common purpose shared by the
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tion, this commonality is by far the most compelling and the most
obvious reason to treat § 1983, Title VII, and the ADEA alike in
terms of claim preclusion. Title VII repeatedly recognizes provid-
ing claimants the opportunity for a trial de novo, even after adjudi-
cation by a state administrative body, provided the agency decision
has not been subjected to judicial review.198 The ADEA, both in
language and in spirit, not only echoes, but in certain instances,
duplicates Title VII, and should enjoy identical res judicata treat-
ment.199 Section 1983 requires a slightly different analysis, which
lead the Elliott Court to fall back on federal common-law princi-
ples when using preclusion to restrict a claimant's choice of forums.
The Court in Elliott implicitly refused to base its inferences solely
on the absence of legislative language, strengthening its holding by
invoking its ability to create federal common-law.2° The Elliott
Court's dependency on federal common-law authority is ultimately
unconvincing. As originally conceived, federal courts were re-
stricted in their ability to create common-law in only those in-
ADEA and Title VII of eliminating discrimination); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180 (an-
nouncing that the purpose of § 1983 and other post-Civil War statutes was to protect
federal constitutional rights).
It is abundantly clear that one reason the [§ 1983] legislation was passed was
to afford a federal right in federal courts because by reason of prejudice,
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced
and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immuni-
ties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state
agencies.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (interpreting the legislative history and
purpose behind the Civil Rights Act of 1871). See also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
98-99 (1980) (noting that "one strong motive" behind passage of § 1983 was the
"grave congressional concern that the state courts had been deficient in protecting
federal rights"); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972) (observing that the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 served as the template for § 1983, with its express purpose to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment). Cf. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 338 (1983)
(noting that another motivation behind passage of § 1983 was the prevention of con-
spiracies to commit perjury in order to exculpate fellow Klansmen).
198. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796 (1986) (upholding Sixth Circuit
ruling that unreviewed state administrative determinations do not have preclusive ef-
fect on claims brought under Title VII); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,
485 (1982) (finding preclusion of Title VII state administrative adjudication in light of
the state court judgment affirming the agency's findings); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425
U.S. 840, 848 (1976) (confirming Congressional intent to allow a trial de novo to fed-
eral Title VII claims).
199. Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 755-56 (noting that the language pertaining to the
authority of state agencies to remedy Title VII and ADEA claims is "virtually in haec
verba", suggesting that ADEA treatment follow that of Title VII). Accord Astoria
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1991) (using established
Title VII construction to interpret the ADEA's preclusion language and intent).
200. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796.
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stances where an important right was lacking an enforcement
mechanism. Acting under the auspices of federal common-law au-
thority, the Supreme Court has actually decreased the amount of
enforcement ability available to the guaranteed protection by
§ 1983. The effects of allowing claim preclusion in § 1983 cases in
an impermissible exercise of the otherwise tightly restricted com-
mon-law created authority enjoyed by federal courts. Instead, as
urged by Justice Stevens, the Elliott Court and those jurisdictions
following the Stillians line of decisions should more closely ex-
amine the broader intent behind each of the statutes in question
and allow the greatest opportunity for enforcement.
Although there are certainly instances where state administra-
tive agencies are not only adequate, but appropriate forums in
which to settle controversies, civil rights merit far greater protec-
tive measures than can be provided by state agencies. The ability
agencies have to perform executive, legislative, and judicial func-
tions indicates the agency's almost certain inability to preserve and
protect the most sacred of constitutional guarantees. State admin-
istrative adjudications are not intended to replace their more for-
mal judicial counterparts, and consequently will continue to lack
the necessary safeguards envisioned by the drafters of civil rights
legislation. These inherent inadequacies, and the paramount com-
mon missions of Title VII, ADEA, and § 1983, prohibit preclusion
of state administrative agency findings in subsequent federal suits.
Fall 2000 Civil Rights are Civil Rights are Civil Rights

